Business profitability and structural change in interwar Australia by Ville, Simon & Merrett, David
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Commerce - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Business and Law 
1-1-2005 
Business profitability and structural change in interwar Australia 
Simon Ville 
University of Wollongong, sville@uow.edu.au 
David Merrett 
University of Melbourne 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers 
 Part of the Business Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ville, Simon and Merrett, David: Business profitability and structural change in interwar Australia 2005, 
2-18. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers/2182 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Business profitability and structural change in interwar Australia 
Abstract 
The Australian economy of the interwar period experienced noteworthy cyclical and secular trends. 
Severe cyclical fluctuations were associated with the international depression, often referred to as the 
‘Great Slump’, which particularly afflicted Australia’s large traded sector, especially its cornerstone primary 
exporting industries. In the midst of this apparent dearth, however, came the ‘plenty’ of the initial stages 
of modernisation, which resulted from the broadening of the country’s economic base into new 
manufacturing industries. The general trends of economic activity are captured by national income data, 
while the expansion of particular industries has been contextualised by several authors, most notably 
Forster for the 1920s. Less clear, however, are the reasons for this structural diversification. One popular 
strain of argument lies in the ability of manufacturers to act as rent seekers, particularly through the 
protection offered by high tariffs and other forms of inducement together with a benign disregard of anti-
competitive behaviour by successive governments. An alternative perspective associates structural 
change in this period with the reaping of new opportunities by ‘corporate leaders’ across a number of 
industries within sectors. In this paper we construct and analyse a time series of the profitability of 
industries in services and manufacturing, which enables us to examine the motivating factors behind 
structural change from the perspective of price signals, in the form of differences in absolute and relative 
rates of return on shareholder equity. This study is the first to use the business profits data for interwar 
Australia. Research on, or including, the interwar period has been undertaken recently for several other 
countries including Britain, Germany, France, and Spain with which some initial comparisons will be 
drawn. 
Keywords 
Business, profitability, structural, change, interwar, Australia 
Disciplines 
Business | Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Publication Details 
Ville, S. & Merrett, D. (2005). Business profitability and structural change in interwar Australia. In 
Economic Society of Australian (Eds.), Proceedings of the 34th Australian Conference of Economists, 
2005 (pp. 2-18). University of Melbourne: Economics Society of Australia. 
This conference paper is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers/2182 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business profitability and structural change in interwar Australia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simon Ville  
University of Wollongong 
 
 And 
  
David Merrett 
University of Melbourne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Permission of the authors is required prior to use of any material contained in this paper
 2 
 
Business profitability and structural change in interwar Australia1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The Australian economy of the interwar period experienced noteworthy 
cyclical and secular trends. Severe cyclical fluctuations were associated with the 
international depression, often referred to as the ‘Great Slump’, which particularly 
afflicted Australia’s large traded sector, especially its cornerstone primary exporting 
industries. In the midst of this apparent dearth, however, came the ‘plenty’ of the 
initial stages of modernisation, which resulted from the broadening of the country’s 
economic base into new manufacturing industries. The general trends of economic 
activity are captured by national income data, while the expansion of particular 
industries has been contextualised by several authors, most notably Forster for the 
1920s.2  Less clear, however, are the reasons for this structural diversification. One 
popular strain of argument lies in the ability of manufacturers to act as rent seekers, 
particularly through the protection offered by high tariffs and other forms of 
inducement together with a benign disregard of anti-competitive behaviour by 
successive governments. An alternative perspective associates structural change in 
this period with the reaping of new opportunities by ‘corporate leaders’3 across a 
number of industries within sectors.   
 In this paper we construct and analyse a time series of the profitability of 
industries in services and manufacturing, which enables us to examine the motivating 
factors behind structural change from the perspective of price signals, in the form of 
differences in absolute and relative rates of return on shareholder equity. This study is 
the first to use the business profits data for interwar Australia.  Research on, or 
including, the interwar period has been undertaken recently for several other countries 
including Britain, Germany, France, and Spain with which some initial comparisons 
will be drawn. 4  
                                                 
1  The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Australian Research Council 
under the Discovery Projects scheme. 
2  N. G. Butlin, ‘Australian national accounts’ in W. Vamplew ed. Australians. Historical 
Statistics (Sydney, 1987)p. 133 ‘Gross domestic product by industry, current prices, Australia, 
1861-1939’; C. Forster, Industrial Development in Australia, 1920-1930 (Canberra, ANU, 
1964). 
3  This term is used in G. Fleming, D. merrett and S. Ville, The Big End of Town. Big Business 
and Corporate Leadership in Twentieth-Century Australia  (Melbourne: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004). 
4  Arnold, A. J. ‘Profitability and capital accumulation in British industry during the transwar 
period, 1913-1924’ Economic History Review, 52, 1, 1999; Tafunell, X. ‘La rentabilidad 
financiera de le empresa espanola, 1880-1981: Una estimacion en perspectiva sectorial. 
(Financial Returns of Spanish Business, 1880-1981: An Estimation from a Sectorial Point of 
View. With English summary.)’, Revista de Historia Industrial, 18, 2000; J. Marseille, Les 
performances des enterprises françaises au XXe siècle Paris: Le Monde editions/CNRS, 
1995); A research agenda of the influence of profitability on historical changes in investment 
is advocated by X. Tafunell and A. Carreras, ‘The profitability of Spanish firms in a European 
perspective’ (Business History Conference and European Business History Association joint 
annual  meeting, Lowell, MA, 2003).M. Spoerer, ‘What new estimates of industrial 
profitability can tell us about the Weimar and the Nazi economy’, Diskussionsbeiträge aus 
dem Volkswirtschaftslehre 520 (1996); Y. Cassis, Big Business. The European Experience in 
the Twentieth Century (Oxford UP, 1997). For a current and more ambitious comparative 
project see: Y. Cassis and C. Brautaset, ‘The performance of European business in the 
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The paper will proceed in a number of steps. First, it will briefly review the 
current literature discussing the changing structure of the Australian economy in the 
inter-war period. Second, the methodology used in constructing the profit data set will 
be discussed. Thirdly, the results will be presented. Finally, issues relating to 
interpreting the data will be examined. 
 
 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
The structure of the Australian economy altered in many ways over the 
interwar decades. The big picture shows a relative growth of manufacturing that was 
largely offset by a contraction in rural and mining activity with the large service 
sector remaining at a roughly constant figure. National income account data of 
product and estimates of capital formation indicate shifts in the relative importance at 
a sector level and between the public and private sector.5 The broad shifts revealed by 
these indicators are mirrored by changes in the distribution of the workforce.6 
Research on particular sectors, industries, or regions provides evidence of absolute 
expansion or decline that adds detail and nuance to the broad sweep of the aggregate 
data.7 
Describing this structural transformation has proven to be more 
straightforward than explaining what caused it to take place. The aggregate measures 
reflected decisions made by tens of thousands of businesses and households day-in 
and day-out. Entrepreneurs, investors and workers sought to maximize their utility 
functions in the light of a set of price signals that did not solely reflect the interplay of 
competitive markets. Prices of both goods and factors, particularly labor, were heavily 
affected by public policy, many other markets were highly concentrated and presumed 
to be influenced by non-competitive modes of behaviour. 
The literature suggests a number of motivating factors driving structural 
change.8 In short, supply side constraints and weakening terms of trade retarded the 
rate of expansion of the rural sector despite a number of public policies designed to 
have the opposite effect. Mining, with the exception of gold after the deva luation of 
the Australian pound, was hostage to fluctuations in the international commodity 
cycle, particularly to the slump of the 1930s. Manufacturing, on the other hand, 
benefited from changing consumer preferences together with rising import protection 
and other forms of government preferment to local producers. Political decisions led 
to increasing state outlays on services such as the provision of public administration, 
health and educational services, the gradual ‘nationalization’ of water and sewerage, 
                                                                                                                                            
twentieth century: a pilot study’ http://www.h-
net.org/~business/bhcweb/publications/BEHonline/2003/Cassisbrautaset.pdf 
5  N. G. Butlin, Australian domestic product, investment and foreign borrowing 1861-1938/39  
(Cambridge: C.U.P. 1962); N. G. Butlin, ‘Some perspectives of Australian economic 
development, 1890-1965’ in C. Forster ed. Australian Economic Development in the 
Twentieth Century (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970); J. A. Dowie, ‘The service ensemble’ in 
Forster ed. Australian Economic Development; W. A. Sinclair, ‘Capital formation’, in Forster 
ed. Australian Economic Development. 
6  M. Keating, ‘The Australian workforce 1910-11 to 1960-61’, Canberra : Dept. of Economic 
History, Research School of Social Sciences, A.N.U., 1973, pp. 356-7.. 
7  Forster, Industrial Development. Notable examples of industry and company studies including 
the interwar period can be found in the bibliography of G. Fleming, D. Merrett and S.Ville, 
The Big End of Town. Big Business and Corporate Leadership in Twentieth-Century Australia 
(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 282-99. 
8  A good coverage of structural change and development can be found in W. A. Sinclair The 
process of economic development in Australia  (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1976). 
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power and gas, and urban transport systems. Public sector investment rose 
significantly compared with private non-residential investment, reflecting 
commitments to both rural and increasingly urban needs, infrastructure in the latter 
being a lagged response to population growth and industrialization. The construction 
industry was dominated by residential building, itself a function of immigration, 
family formation and the relocation of population to capital cities and the industrial 
cities on the New South Wales’ coast. 
The changing structure of the economy therefore reflected decisions made by 
political and economic actors. Governments imposed their preferences on the pattern 
of economic activity through a variety of means. Borrowing, taxation and revenues 
from public sector utilities funded investment and maintenance of infrastructure and 
the ongoing delivery of government services. The direct involvement of the state in 
economic life expanded in the inter-war period.9 The influence of the government’s 
budget programs went far beyond the rising share of public expenditure in GDP. 
Government policies changed the incentives facing economic actors by altering 
relative prices for goods and factors.  The impact of public policy, particularly trade 
barriers and centralised wage setting, on the relative prices and costs of Australian and 
foreign goods has provoked debate since the 1920s.10 The expansion of manufacturing 
employment and output was possible as domestic prices rose behind the protective 
tariff. A contemporary study estimated that prices and costs in ‘protected’ industries 
were between 10 to 12 percent higher than they otherwise would have been in the 
1920s and 1930s.11  Likewise, government subsidies towards rural industries 
including under priced R&D, loss making infrastructure and utilities, price support 
schemes, and state marketing monopolies gave rise to further price distortions. 
The conventional wisdom that public policy was the principal driver of 
structural change has come under scrutiny on two fronts. First, it is not clear that 
tariffs and other trade barriers and subsidies provided to industries increased their 
profitability. The issue is the degree to which the additional revenues resulting from 
such policies were appropriated by the owners of the firms or by their suppliers, 
customers or workers. The authors of the Brigden Report draw attention to reports of 
the Tariff Board that complain about increases in tariff rates being matched by claims 
for higher wages. The operation of the Australian centralized wages system, that 
attempted to protect real wages, strengthened the hand of labor in the distribution of 
revenues.12 On other occasions the Tariff Board cautioned that it would remove 
prevailing levels of protection to those industries whose ‘shareholders dividends 
[were] considerably in excess of the ordinary commercial rates.’13 More recently, 
Mark Thomas has argued that the recovery of the manufacturing sector in the 1930s 
                                                 
9  N.G. Butlin, A. Barnard, J.J. Pincus, Government and capitalism : public and private choice 
in twentieth century Australia  (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1982). 
10  F. C. C. Benham, The prosperity of Australia: an economic analysis (London: P.S.King, 
1928); E. O. G. Shann, An economic history of Australia (Camb.: C.U.P., 1948); J.B. Brigden 
The Australian tariff : an economic enquiry (Melbourne : Melbourne University Press in 
association with Macmillan, 1929). 
11  J. F. Nimmo, ’The effect of the tariff on the Australian consumption standard’, in F. W. 
Eggleston, et. al., Australian Standards of Living (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press in 
association with Oxford University Press, 1939), 151. 
12  Kenneth F. Walker, Australian Industrial Relations Systems, (Cambridge: Mass. : Harvard 
University Press, 1970; Keith Hancock and Sue Richardson, ‘Economic and social effects’ in 
Joe Isaac and Stuart Macintyre, eds, The New Province for Law and Order (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 151-54. 
13  Brigden, Australian Tariff, 167 
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owed more to cost reductions stemming from ‘increased efficiency and productivity’ 
than ‘higher tariffs and a depreciated currency.’14 This view resonates with our study 
of large firms that found them to be investing in new technologies and superior 
organizational forms as a way of creating competitive advantage.15 
  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 Our data source is Jobson’s Investment Digest of Australia and New Zealand, 
also periodically known as the Australian Investment Digest, or the Investment Digest, 
a monthly (later fortnightly) publication compiled by Alex Jobson from 1920 and 
including, ‘a summary of all Australian company reports published...up to the latest 
moment’.16  Jobson’s, as it was commonly known, also included regular reports and 
data on business profitability. This information was extracted from balance sheets in 
the individual company reports and then aggregated by major industry groups on a 
year-by-year basis.  It included information on declared profit, net of taxes and 
interest charges, total paid up capital, and total shareholder funds. A number of 
methodological issues should be highlighted particularly in relation to the accuracy 
and completeness of the source data along with its interpretation and presentation for 
the purposes of measuring profitability. 
 
Accuracy and completeness of source data 
 There are some known omissions and actual or potential errors. Jobson’s 
provides no data for 1928 and only very broad industry groups for 1919. For 1927, 
1929, 1935, and possibly 1937 we have data aggregated from company reports 
declared in only three of the four reporting quarters of the year and only half a year’s 
data for 1938, although this does not appear to have built in a particular bias between 
industries in terms of numbers of firms covered.17 For the years 1931-3 no data is 
provided on total shareholder funds or paid up capital. Therefore, we have decided to 
take the average of the preceding and subsequent years, 1930 and 1934 respectively. 
For most industries there are only modest variations of less than 5 per cent in 
shareholder funds between the two years.18  In these years at the depth of the 
depression it was profit rather than shareholder funds that was particularly affected by 
the business cycle.  The reporting year was used in all cases even where a company 
reported early in the calendar year for a period mostly covering the previous year.  
Recording the data against the previous calendar year would have invoked an 
alternative misplacement effect, especially for firms reporting towards the end of the 
calendar year. Some smoothing exercises, using a moving three-year average, also 
help to evaluate any potential short term distortions.  It is to be expected that an 
exercise of this scale would bring with it some typographical (numbers transposed), 
aggregation, and printing (columns duplicated) errors. In most identified cases of 
                                                 
14  Mark Thomas, ‘Manufacturing and economic recovery in Australia, 1932-1937’, in R. G. 
Gregory and N. G. Butlin, eds, Recovery from the depression:Australia and the world 
economy in the 1930s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 271. 
15  Fleming, Merrett & Ville, Big End, chs 4 & 7. 
16 Australian Investment Digest vol 1, no. 1, January 1920, p. 3.  
17  Time and cost willing, it would be possible to go through all of the company annual reports 
for years in which Jobson’s summarised data was missing or incomplete. 
18  The exceptions are largely industries undergoing expansion (airways, electricity, insurance, 
metallic mining, printing, and sugar) or those severely affected by the depression and drawing 
down reserves including some wholesale, retail, farming, and motor trading. 
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source error, it was possible to rectify the mistake, in a few largely minor cases the 
data had to be left unaltered.   
 Jobson’s initially claimed to draw its data from all companies listed on the 
stock exchanges of the Commonwealth. However, there were some omissions as it 
conceded. It excluded life assurance companies, ‘owing to the impossibility of stating 
their net annual profit as a group’.19  Mining companies were also stated to have been 
excluded although the data includes many ‘coal’ companies and, later in the period, 
also lead and zinc. P & O Shipping, although listed in Australia, was omitted by 
Jobson’s on the grounds that its predominantly overseas activities meant that it was 
little affected by local conditions, and because its large size would distort the overall 
picture presented. Two unnamed firms were excluded from the initial listing in 1920 
because they had not issued reports. P & O’s exclusion raises the broader issue of the 
treatment of multinationals. Australia has traditiona lly hosted many multinationals 
and in the 1920s there was a large influx of American and British firms.20  
Multinationals would be locally listed where a subsidiary was incorporated in 
Australia or where a dual listing occurred. However, some multinationals operated 
branches in Australia without a local listing.  Unavoidably, therefore, our figures will 
not include all foreign companies although it does include many of them.  In 1930 20 
of the top 100 non-finance firms listed in Australia were foreign registered and at least 
another five were locally registered subsidiaries of foreign firms. These included 
major corporations such as British Tobacco, Dunlop, Nestles, Goodyear, and Peters.21  
Conversely, many New Zealand companies were included: large firms such as 
New Zealand Insurance are to be found but also many small local ones that did not 
conduct business operations in Australia. They would appear to be the companies 
listed on the New Zealand stock exchanges but no explicit statement on this has been 
found, nor is it clear when they were first included. Perhaps significantly, from 1924 
New Zealand, with Australia, was included in the name of the Digest. It was not until 
the end of the 1920s that the two countries were distinguished in the profit data and 
then only in the national figure rather than by industry. In 1930 New Zealand 
accounted for 14 per cent of the number of companies in the data but only 6 per cent 
of total shareholder funds, indicating the limited number and proportionately smaller 
size of New Zealand companies.22 In the following years, the accompanying analysis 
by Jobson’s distinguished between the operating conditions and corporate 
performance in each country 
The absence of reports from two listed companies in 1920, mentioned above, 
is indicative of the limited disclosure reporting requirements of the time. Among the 
remainder of firms that did report, inconsistencies are probable from a lack of 
stringency in accounting standards.  As Jobson’s noted, ‘the treatment of such items 
                                                 
19  Australian Investment Digest vol 1, no. 6, June 1920, p. 1. 
20  Forster, Industrial Development, pp. 230-2 cites 85 British and American firms that began 
manufacturing in Australia in the 1920s or ‘substantially expanded their operations’. Jobson’s 
figures included xx of these. 
21  G. Fleming, D. Merrett and S.Ville, The Big End of Town. Big Business and Corporate 
Leadership in Twentieth-Century Australia (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
p. 17 and appendix C. 
22  For example Otago Farmers Cooperative Association, a small Dunedin based organis ation of 
local farmer shareholders, had only £56 000 in paid up capital at the end of World War One. 
Hocken Archives, Otago Farmers Cooperative Association Balance Sheets 144/89. S. Ville, 
The Rural Entrepreneurs. A History of the Stock and Station Agent Industry in Australia and 
New Zealand (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 90 for full run of their 
interwar capitalisation. 
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as depreciation, provision for doubtful debts, taxation and other contingencies is 
subject to very wide variation’. But concludes, ‘the general results disclosed may in 
the majority of cases be taken as indicative of prevailing tendencies’.23  The relatively 
simple structure and organisation of most Australian companies at this time with few 
groups or overseas subsidiaries, did at least mitigate the problem of inconsistent 
handling of subsidiary company profits.  More pernicious were deliberate attempts to 
falsify profits and the related creation of hidden reserves, indicating a mismatch 
between actual and reported returns. Some cases certainly existed in Australia, 
including that of Tooths, where understatement or smoothing commonly occurred 
through the development of secret reserves prior to a major change in the Companies 
Act in 1961.24 There is no indication as to how widespread such practices were in 
Australia, nor that their incidence would bias results between industries or over time 
in such a way as to invalidate the large dataset used here.  Evidence has been 
produced for interwar Britain and Germany of underdeclaration of profitability in 
good years and overdeclaration in poor years, creating a cyclical smoothing effect 
rather than an upward or downward bias.25 
Inspite of these omissions, the extent of the data brought together by Jobson’s, 
on over 500 companies in many full years, is highly impressive in terms of its 
aggregate size, annual regularity, and its distribution across sectors.26  The alternative 
methodology of several recent writers, including Arnold, Capie & Billings, and 
Cassis, is to focus on the unpublished archival accounts of a constant sample of 
companies as a means of overcoming some of these methodological problems.27 Such 
an approach may more closely approximate to actual profits but even unpublished 
material will contain errors, omissions, and inconsistent practices for this period. 
Moreover, our intention is to reflect profit performance sectorally and nationally, so 
the need is for encompassing coverage of current companies rather than tracking the 
rise or fall of individual enterprises.  
 
Interpretation and presentation of source data 
There are a variety of methods for calculating profitability, depending upon 
the data available and the investigative goals being pursued, which include the return 
on assets, capital, or equity, and the holding return. 28 The data available to us will 
focus our investigation on the measurement of the return on shareholder equity. This 
will be derived from declared profit, net of taxes and interest charges, as a percentage 
                                                 
23  Australian Investment Digest vol 1, no. 1, January 1920, p. 3. 
24  M. Wilson and G. Shailer, ‘Political costs, income measurement and disclosure: a case study 
from the brewing industry, 1910-65’ (School of Business and Information Management, 
Australian National University). 
25  Arnold, ‘Profitability and capital accumulation’; C. J. Napier, ‘Secret accounting: the P & O 
Group in the interwar years’, Accounting, Business and Financial History 1 (3), 1991; M. 
Spoerer, ‘Window dressing in German interwar balance sheets’, Accounting, Business and 
Financial History 8 (3), 1998. 
26  The shareholder funds employed by these companies in manufacturing in 1936 represents 
about one third of an estimate of capital stock for that year in 1939 prices. Vamplew, 
Historical Statistics, p. 300. E. A. Boehm,  20th Century Economic Development in Australia. 
(Melbourne: Longman, 1972), pp. 8-9 provides sectoral distribution comparisons. 
27  Arnold, ‘Profitability and capital accumulation’; Capie, F. and Billings, M. (2001), 
Profitability in English Banking in the Twentieth Century, European Review of Economic 
History, 5 (3); Cassis, European Experience. The latter also confined his study to selected 
benchmark years. 
28  Arnold, ‘Profitability and capital accumulation’; Capie & Billings, ‘English banking’; Cassis 
and Brautaset, ‘Performance of European business’. 
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of total shareholder funds. The latter consists of paid up capital on ordinary and 
preference shares plus accumulated reserves, which is assumed to include current 
retained earnings. Return on assets or total capital (equity and fixed return) would 
require going back to a sample of individual company balance sheets, which is not our 
intention in this particular exercise.  Holding returns to shareholders (annualised 
changes in share price plus dividends) requires a company-by-company approach or 
the existence of national series for share prices and dividends. Such series do not exist 
on a disaggregated basis for Australia for this period, and their usefulness would 
suffer from the thinness of the contemporary equity market, while the constant 
dividend policy of many companies would smooth out real profit vicissitudes to some 
degree.   
In a longitudinal series, year to year changes in price levels may inflate or 
deflate the real level of profitability. While the figures for net profit are current for 
each year, shareholder funds, with the exception of new issues, are carried forward 
from year to year and thus susceptible to the effects of price vicissitudes. Therefore, 
we include an adjustment calculation based upon changes in the general price level 
from year to year, there being no suitable specific price indices available. A GDP 
price deflator index is used in preference to a consumer price index. The latter is not 
based upon a fixed basket of goods and services, and it therefore reflects changes in 
consumption patterns with the rise and fall of different industries.  Price adjustment is 
not an unexceptionable improvement in the presentation of our data, for example the 
choice of base year(s) will affect the absolute results.29 Moreover, for cross-sectional 
comparisons between industries, there is little point in applying a general price index 
since the net effect will be zero. Thus, our calculation of nominal profitability can be 
expressed formally as: 
 
  RoE (%) = [NP/TSF]100 
 
Or, price adjusted, as: 
 
  RoE (%) = [NP/{TSF(1+?p)}]100 
           
where RoE is return on equity, NP net profits, TSF total shareholder funds, ?p annual 
percentage change in the general price level. 
 The depth of our data allows us to move from an annual national rate of return 
to repeat the exercise sector by sector and industry by industry.  Jobson’s 
disaggregates the data into a series of industry groups but does not explain the 
reasoning behind its choice of sets. Initially, we analysed the disaggregated data in 
this ‘raw’ form before resorting it into more modern groupings.  These include broad 
subdivisions such as primary, secondary, and tertiary. More detailed disaggregation is 
achieved through rearrangement into ANZSIC (Australian and New Zealand Standard 
Industrial Classification) categories. This is not a perfect taxonomy but the mostly 
                                                 
29  Taken from P. Shergold, ‘Prices and consumption’ in Vamplew ed. Australians, p. 219, 
‘Gross domestic product, price deflator, 1851-1985’. For our purposes, the average of 1919 
and 1920 is used as the deflator’s base years. For a good discussion of the alternative ways of 
handling the impact of price inflation on rates of return see Capie & Billings, ‘English 
banking’, pp. 385-8. 
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widely used and accepted.30  We also use the disaggregated data to measure structural 
change through the proxy of shares of total shareholder funds.  
 
  
RESULTS 
Chart 1: Nominal and price adjusted net profitability, 1920-38 
Nationally, profits remained on a relatively high plateau of around 8 per cent 
from 1920-9 before falling sharply to around 4 per cent during 1931-3. Thereafter, 
they rose progressively through the 1930s back up to 1920s levels by the end of the 
decade. The nominal and real profit series show broadly similar trends although the 
overall effect of price adjustment has been to compress the cyclical fluctuations, 
providing a somewhat lower return during the rising price and high profit years for 
most of the 1920s and a somewhat higher return than nominal for the deflation low 
profit years of the 1930s. Initial comparisons with overseas studies suggest similar 
patterns in terms of profit magnitude and trend. A cross-country comparison for 1927-
9 puts Australia (8.25 per cent) slightly below United Kingdom (10.6) Spain and 
France (9.8) but above Germany (7.2).31 The interwar trend is similar to figures we 
have for Spain except that the Civil War delays economic and business recovery until 
the eve of World War Two.32 
 
Chart 2: Adjusted return on equity and bonds, 1920-38 
The government bond rate has been added to chart 2 alongside the profit rate, 
enabling us to compare the rate of return on so-called riskless government paper with 
that of shareholder funds. Sometimes referred to as the equity premium or risk 
premium, the generally higher return to shareholders compensates for the greater risks 
involved.  The evidence indicates a higher though slightly more volatile return to 
shareholder equity, confirming the existence of a risk premium in all years except 
1931 and 1932 at the depth of the depression. The mean profitability across the 
interwar period was 7.1 per cent compared with a bond rate of 5.27 per cent indicating 
a mean  premium of 1.83 percentage points, and the standard deviations were 1.33 and 
1.06 per cent respectively for profits and bonds.  
 
Chart 3: Equity premiums 
Economists have spilt much ink over the so-called ‘equity premium puzzle’ 
identified by Mehra and Prescott some twenty years ago.33  The puzzle lay in 
explaining American evidence of a large and persistent equity premium in contrast to 
the convergence predictions of competitive equilibrium models.  Over the course of 
90 years to 1978, the mean equity premium in the United States was over 6 per cent; 
for the two interwar decades it was 14.64 (1919-28) and 0.18 (1929-38) per cent. 
Using a different profits methodology, we found respective premiums of 2.08 and 
1.63 per cent. The results are interesting for indicating a much lower and therefore 
less puzzling equity premium in Australian experience.  The lower volatility of the 
equity premium within (smaller standard deviations) and between periods for 
Australia may provide some of the answer in itself for its smaller magnitude. Lower 
                                                 
30  For example, it focuses on products rather than functions and thus misses vertical 
interrelationships.  
31  Tafunell & Carreras, ‘Profitability of Spanish firms’, p. 12. 
32  Tafunell & Carreras, ‘Profitability of Spanish firms’, p. 6. 
33  R. Mehra and E. C. Prescott, ‘The equity premium. A puzzle’, Journal of Monetary 
Economics 15 (1985), pp. 145-61. 
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volatility in turn may be related to income smoothing exercises by firms that used 
reserves to pay constant dividend rates.34  The effect was to give equity a debt- like 
appearance in the eyes of firms and their investors.  
For our purposes, these results question whether excessive profits were being 
generated by Australian businesses. Of course, this merely provides an average equity 
premium across the corporate economy. Our sectoral level data enables us to construct 
an equity premium for manufacturing, which was expanding rapidly and was a major 
recipient of government largesse. The manufacturing premium was 3.87 per cent, 
double that of the national equity premium, reflecting perhaps the greater risk of 
investing in new industries and some first mover rents most particularly in the 1920s. 
Again, however, this is not an excessive benefit for risk in these circumstances and 
still well below Mehra and Prescott’s economy-wide results for the United States. 
 
Chart 4: Net Profit as a Percentage of Total Shareholder Funds by Main ANZSIC 
Codes, 1920-38 
There are sustained sectoral differences between the rate of return on 
shareholders’ funds through the interwar period, for example between manufacturing 
and wholesaling. How did investors respond to these price signals? In a perfectly 
competitive market investors would react to knowledge of above average returns by 
increasing capacity until the enlarged supply relative to demand drove down returns. 
The existence of mobility barriers and government policies can potentially offset the 
pressure of competition on industry returns. Persistent differences may provide an 
indication of the strength of barriers to competition. In the case of interwar Australian 
manufacturing, the profit differentials are not so large as to be a cause for concern. On 
average they were 2.3 per cent above the mean, again perhaps a not unreasonable 
premium for the additional risk of new sector investment.  
A closer look at individual manufacturing industries throws additional light on 
the question of relative performance. The better performing industries were those 
associated with rapid technological change and consequent opportunities for increased 
efficiency such as publishing and brewing. Other industries, particularly those 
associated with the primary sector such as meat freezing and timber performed poorly, 
achieving below the national mean. 
 
Chart 5: Total shareholder funds distributed by main ANZSIC, 1920-38  
The relationship between profits and subsequent investment decisions throws 
light upon the competitive structure of an industry and other sources of price friction.  
In the absence of such distortions, we would expect higher profits to attract fresh 
investment into the industry by new or existing players.  Manufacturing’s average rate 
of profitability across the period at 9.03 per cent was the highest of any ANZSIC code 
and better than the average for all years (Chart 4).  Share of total shareholder funds is 
used as a rough proxy for investment decisions in chart 5. It shows an expansion in 
manufacturing’s share from around 16 to over 40 per cent, a more rapid increase than 
suggested by other proxy indicators such as workforce and investment distribution. 35 
                                                 
34  In a limited equity market such as interwar Australia, this was a means of attracting  relatively 
low risk investors. Fleming, Merrett, & Ville, Big End, p. 150. 
35  Manufacturing’s share of labour force rose from 20 to 24 per cent and as a share of gorss 
domestic capital formation from 11 to 14 per cent during 1920-38. G. Withers, T. Endres and 
L. Perry, ‘Australian Historical Statistics: Labour Statistics’, Source Papers in Economic 
History 7 (1985: Canberra, Australian National University), pp. 100-1; N. G. Butlin, ‘Select 
comparative economic statistics, 1900-40: Australia and Britain, Canada, Japan and New 
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By contrast, the poor profit performance of the wholesale trade of 5.46 per cent 
against a national interwar mean of 6.73 is reflected in its declining share of funds 
from about 6 to under 2 per cent and provides statistical confirmation of the 
contextual story of the decline of ma jor importers/wholesalers during this period, such 
as D. & W. Murray, Lovell & Christmas, and D. & J. Fowler Ltd, squeezed at either 
end of the value chain by retailers and manufacturers.36 In finance and insurance, 
there is a close trend fit between declining profit rate and share of funds from the mid 
1920s to early 1930s in light of the domino effect of the slump on the sector’s lending 
strategies. The most obvious mismatch is in the utilities sector between stable high 
profits, second only to manufacturing at 8.35 per cent mean, and a low share of funds. 
In this case, the exercise of quasi monopolies by regional companies like AGL, in an 
environment of rapidly increasing residential and commercial demand for electricity, 
and the impact of the encroachment of government ownership into the sector provide 
the most likely explanations.37 
 
 
INTERPRETATION OF DATA 
 The data show that there were differences in the rates of return between 
industries in each year and that the relative set of rates altered over time. However, 
there is a variation around the mean rather than an equalisation of profit rates across 
industries as might be expected in an economy with perfectly competitive product and 
financial markets. There are two streams of literature in the field of industrial 
organization that suggest persistent differences in returns on shareholders’ funds 
between industries. One relates to structural conditions within an industry that are 
enjoyed by all firms. The structure-conduct-performance paradigm suggests that there 
is a positive relationship between the level of seller concentration and profitability.38  
Michael Porter’s ‘structural analysis of industries’ takes a wider view in explaining 
differences in ‘industry attractiveness’ by exploring the impact of relationships with 
suppliers and customers on profitability as well as considering concentration, firm 
conduct, barriers to entry and exit, and the strength of substitutes.39 The other stream 
relates to differences in intra- industry profits. Michael Porter has theorized why firms 
within the same industry will pursue different strategies that generate different rates of 
return that persist over time.40 Dennis Mueller’s study of the profitability of 600 US 
manufacturing firms demonstrated that there was no convergence to a mean of the 
zero economic rent, the equivalent of the cost of capital. 41 Differences in profitability 
continued in the long term.  
                                                                                                                                            
Zealand’, Source Papers in Economic History 4 (1984: Canberra, Australian National 
University), table Aa7. 
36  Fleming, Merrett, & Ville, Big End, pp. 89-90, 170-1. Burns Philp was one of the few 
wholesalers to survive and it did so by backward and forward vertical integration into 
resources and retailing. 
37  ‘Electricity’ in Jobson’s Investment Digest 16, no. 18, 16. 9. 1935, pp. 377-8. 
38  For a discussion of this literature and associated empirical studies see Douglas F. Greer, 
Industrial Organization and Public Policy (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1992), 3rd ed, 
595-609. For an application to profitability in Australian manufacturing in the 1970s see 
Richard Caves, Ian Ward, Philip Williams and Courtney Wright, Australian Industry: 
Structure, conduct, performance (Sydney: Prentice-Hall of Australia, 1981), 90-94 
39  Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for analysing industries and competitors 
(New York: The Free Press, 1980).  
40  Michael E. Porter, ‘The structure within industries and companies’ performance’, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 61, 2, 1979, 214-27. 
41  D. C. Mueller, ‘The persistence of profits above the norm’, Economica, 44, 1977, 369-80. 
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 Structural characteristics of many industries and the conduct of firms in the 
inter-war period would lead us to anticipate that there would be persistent differences 
in rates of return between industries. Recent research has identified rapid increases in 
the level of seller concentration in many important industries including brewing, glass 
and the media.42 The ability to reap economies of scale following the introduction of 
new technologies was a principal cause of this phenomenon. A few firms quickly built 
scale to supply regional and then national markets becoming entrenched behind high 
barriers to entry. Vertical integration or close collaboration along industry ‘value 
chains’ became commonplace in the base metal mining, smelting and metal 
fabrication industries.  Firms, particularly in consumer durables industries and fast 
moving packaged goods such as cigarettes, built up brands that deterred entry. Firms 
gained and sustained competitive advantages by generating internal competences. 
These included superior organizational design and privileged access to finance 
through retained earnings and the ability to raise debt and equity more cheaply than 
rivals. In many other industries firms cooperated with direct competitors and with 
suppliers and customers on a range of price and non-price issues. Evidence of price 
collusion in banking, wool selling, stock broking and the profe ssions for instance, or 
imposed resale price conditions of distributors led writers such as Karmel and Brunt, 
and Butlin, Barnard and Pincus, that Australian business used ‘all the restrictive 
practices known to man’43  
 It might be expected that the reallocation of resources in response to shifts in 
price signals for investors, rates of return, were constrained by the ‘distortions’ 
wrought by government policy, and high levels of seller concentration and anti-
competitive behaviour by firms that limited entry and exit. On the other hand, there 
was evidence of a dynamic response by entrepreneurs to what were perceived as 
opportunities offered by the adoption of new technologies, often introduced under 
licence from abroad, that undermined existing industries and created new ones. 
Changes in consumer preferences, particularly with respect to the introduction of new 
goods and services, played a parallel role in this Schumpeterian process of creative 
destruction. Some examples would be the introduction of radio and the cinema as new 
forms of mass entertainment, chain stores undermining independent general stores, 
the advent of the motor car, the telephone, gas stoves and a range of domestic 
appliances, the use of electricity for lighting and power in offices, factories and 
residences. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The existence of a relatively modest equity premium and the broad 
coincidence of sectoral movements in profits and total shareholder funds suggest that 
the profit signals were comparatively robust. In which case, the natur e and rate of 
structural change taking place in the Australian economy between the wars cannot be 
explained entirely, or perhaps even largely, by interfirm collusion, the exercise of 
concentrated market power, the political influence of business coalitions, or other 
forms of non-competitive activity. On the other hand, persistent differences in rates of 
return existed across sectors. In Big End of Town, we showed the ability of prime 
movers and challengers to stake their place as corporate leaders through a range of 
                                                 
42  Fleming, Merrett & Ville, Big End of Town, ch. 3. 
43  P. H. Karmel and Maureen Brunt, The Structure of the Australian Economy (Melbourne: F. 
W. Cheshire, 1962) 95. The phrase is repeated in N. G. Butlin, A. Barnard and J. J. Pincus, 
Government and Capitalism (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1982, 108.  
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efficiency based strategies.44 For interwar manufacturers, this included technology-
induced scale economies (such as Humes, Australian Glass Manufacturers, Herald & 
Weekly Times, and Tooths), transaction cost economies through vertical integration 
(BHP), and scope economies through related diversification (CSR).  Measurement of 
profit performance at the corporate level and the use of additional proxies of structural 
change are envisaged as future agendas arising from the current work. 
 
  
                                                 
44  Fleming, Merrett & Ville, Big End of Town, ch. 4. 
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Chart 2: Adjusted return on equity and bonds
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Chart 3: Equity premiums
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Chart 4: Net Profit as a Percentage of Total Shareholder Funds 
by ANZSIC Code, 1920-38
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Chart 5: Total shareholder funds distributed by main ANZSIC, 1920-38 
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